

1. PART I

CHINESE MARINE CAPTURE FISHERIES FOR 1950 TO THE LATE 1990s: THE HOPES, THE PLANS AND THE DATA

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1.1. Summary and conclusions

This contribution reviews the development of Chinese marine fisheries and fleet structure since the founding of the People's Republic of China ('China,' excluding Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan) in 1949, up to the present, with emphasis on the type and quality of underlying statistical information, especially on landings. Our main purpose is to provide a basis for evaluating the credibility of reported nominal catches, with particular emphasis on total marine landing increases from the mid 1980s to the late 1990s, and thereby to complement the analysis of spatially disaggregated Chinese fisheries catch statistics presented by R. Watson in Part II of this volume.

Our main conclusion, derived from several independent, but converging lines of evidence is that the exponential increase of Chinese marine fisheries landings from the mid-1980s to the late 1990s was largely based on over-reporting of convenient figures by local officials. Indeed, over-reporting of production statistics has been a persistent problem in China, affecting a number of sectors, not only fisheries. The Chinese government's latest response to this, a 'zero growth' policy, serves to help in making local officials aware of the need to report on qualitative, rather than quantitative changes in the performance of the fisheries. In the meantime, however, the true level of China's fisheries catches will have to be inferred, if approximately, through comparison with catches from other parts of the world, and the correction factors emerging from this used to pinpoint further the administrative mechanisms which have led to the inflated catch estimates for the 1980s and 1990s.

1.2. Introduction

This contribution reviews the development of the Chinese marine fisheries since the founding of the People's Republic of China ('China,' excluding Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan; Fig. 1) in 1949,

up to the year 2000, with emphasis on the type and reliability of the statistical information these fisheries generated.

This study was prompted by the growing suspicion, among fisheries scientists and managers, both in China and abroad (FAO/FI 1999), that the reports of strongly increasing landings for the period from the mid-1980s to the late 1990s may have been inflated, and do not reflect actual landings, nor the productive capacity of the Chinese continental shelf and adjacent waters.

Contrary to many accounts of Chinese 'fisheries' (e.g., Zhu 1980), this report does not cover China's large aquaculture/mariculture industries, nor China's inland (freshwater) fisheries. Likewise, we will discuss only casually the biology, ecology and distribution of major exploited species, as this has been recently done by Chen (1999), based on as much recent data as seem to be available. Further, we do not differentiate between catches and landings (though we use mainly the latter term), as discarding of by-catch does not appear to be a problem in China. On the other hand, we do differentiate between 'nominal landings' (i.e., official landing figures) and 'real' landings, the latter being unknown, and the whole point of this contribution.

Note, finally, that we use numbered endnotes for citations to material originally in Chinese, here transcribed through the Pinyin system, and to some pertinent materials available on-line (notably translations of official documents), while standard references, citing author(s) and year, are used for all other bibliographic material.

1.3. Historical Overview of Chinese Marine Capture Fisheries

The Chinese marine capture fisheries experienced considerable growth since the founding of the People's Republic of China, in 1949. However, this growth was irregular, due to a series of political crises, and the ensuing recoveries. The major steps in this uneven development are: (a) Postwar Recovery (1949-1952); (b) First 5-Year Plan (1953-1957); (c) Second 5-Year Plan/Great Leap Forward (1958-1962); (d) Three-Year Re-Adjustment Period (1963-1966); (e) Cultural Revolution and Aftermath (1966 - 1978); and (f) Return to Normalcy and Growth (1978-present). However, the official Chinese fisheries statistics, as submitted to FAO, reflect the changes and upheavals that went along with these events only imperfectly, if at all (Fig. 2).



Figure 1. Chinese coastal provinces and territories. The adjacent shelf area (down to 200 m depth) is about 374, 000 km² (Chen 1999). Note that bottom trawling is banned within the inshore closure

Few records are available from the Postwar Recovery Period. Overall landings for this period appeared to have increased rapidly, starting from a base of about 0.6 million t in 1950 and reaching one million t in 1952,¹ most of it caught by non-motorized coastal vessels (Sarhage and Lundbeck 1992, p. 214; see also Table 1).

The growth momentum established during the postwar recovery period continued through the First 5-Year Plan, nominal landings increasing to about 1.7 million t in 1955.² However, Sarhage and Lundbeck (1992, p. 214) note that, “early statistics were rather inaccurate,” suggesting, “it is possible that the catches before 1958 were higher than indicated.”

Be it as it may, the established trends of increases in fishing effort and landings did not continue in the following period: what was to be the Second 5-Year Plan turned into the Great Leap Forward, itself ending in a catastrophic decline of production in literally all sectors of the Chinese economy, leading to widespread famines accentuated by a series of droughts and other calamities (Hunter and Sexton 1999). Official statistics from this period reflect this as stagnating landings, continuing during the subsequent Three-Year Re-adjustment Period (see, e.g., Fig. 113 in Sarhage and Lundbeck, 1992). Throughout the 1960s, nominal landings remained around 2 million t and Chinese fishers targeted relatively large and valuable demersal and benthopelagic species, such as large and small yellow croakers, flounder and other flatfish, pollock and cuttlefish.³ Nominal fisheries catches did increase during the Cultural Revolution and its Aftermath, but rather slowly. This is not a surprise, given the turmoil prevailing during the Cultural Revolution (Hunter and Sexton 1999; Lippit 2000), also known as “ten years of disasters.” Indeed, various fisheries were closed during this period, to prevent victims of the Cultural Revolution, and/or even disillusioned fish workers, to use fishing vessels to leave the country.⁴

By the late 1970s, the economically important species targeted during the previous period had been largely depleted (see below for the example of large yellow croaker), and species such as filefishes, and herring, which had been spurned earlier, became the target of directed fisheries, and contributing increasingly to total landings.⁵

However, overall economic growth started to pick up as successive reforms were launched, the first of these, promulgated in 1978, being devoted to the agricultural and fisheries sectors (Blecher 2000).

In its first stage (1978-1984), this reform abolished the People’s Commune system that had been in place since 1958, and replaced it with a ‘household contract responsibility’ system that linked remuneration to output. However, nominal landings grew only 1.2%, from 3.5 million tons in 1976 to 3.9 million tons in 1985.⁴ Indeed, this period bracketed a net decline in nominal catches, from about 1978 to the early 1980s (Fig. 2). A government report of 1979 on the state of the country’s fisheries pointed out that the expansion of bottom trawling and stake nets had depleted the resources, and induced the collapse of several species.⁶ That same report called for a stabilization of overall fishing effort at current levels, the replacement of trawling by gillnetting and other fixed gear, etc. Given the manifest decline of China’s own coastal resources, this report also suggested distant water fishing as outlet for its excess fishing capacity, and as source of fish. The conservation measures proposed in that report were not implemented, but the expansion into distant water fishing was (Mathew 1999).

In March 1985, China sent its first Distant Water Fleet (DWF) to West Africa. The West African countries in which China’s DWF has been operating, thus “turning foreign aid into commercial benefits.” are Gabon, Gambia, Guinée, Guinea-Bissau, Mauritania, Morocco, Senegal and Sierra-Leone. China however, never became an important player in that part of the world, where DWF catches were earlier dominated by countries from the former Soviet block, and now by countries from the European Union (see Bonfil et al. 1998). Other countries in which the Chinese DWF has been operating include Argentina (squids), Malaysia, Indonesia (major spp. not available), the Philippines, Marshall Islands and Mauritius (tuna), New Zealand (squids), Pakistan (demersal fishes), Iran, Sri Lanka, Columbia (tuna), Peru, Palau (tuna, since 1987), Russia (demersals, incl. pollock), Thailand (spp. n.a.), and Yemen (squids). Moreover, high sea fishing fleet operate in the North Pacific (squids), the Indian Ocean and Central Western Atlantic (tuna, see below).

In 1981, another government report on ‘outstanding fishery problems’ identified overcapacity as the overriding issue, and called for suppression of capacity growth through measures such as diverting the larger motor boats to offshore fishing, lowering inshore catch target level, and transferring surplus fishing vessel crew to fish processing and aquaculture, etc.⁷ In 1983, the government issued another statement calling for a stop to catch increases (see below for a




Figure 2. Timeline of key events for Chinese fisheries, 1950-2000 (based on data in Tables 3 and 5, and narrative in the text).

reprise of this), stricter control over the increase of fishing boat numbers, protection and increase of inshore resources through artificial restocking, the development of offshore fishing, and speeding up the development of a DWF.

These various reports and ineffectual calls to action are not mentioned here because they led to the intended interventions, but on the contrary, because they did not lead to anything except for the development of a Chinese DWF. Thus, they provide a basis for understanding the next phase in a gradual loss of control, culminating in semi-anarchic developments within the 'mass fishery' sector, and national landing statistics that ended up grossly overestimating catches.

Between 1985-1992, the agriculture reform entered a second stage, marked by the elimination of the state monopoly of purchase and marketing of agricultural products, and the gradual re-emergence of a now dominant strong private sector (Table 2). The relaxation of price control over fisheries products in 1985 and China's Fishery Act of 1986 had a strong impact on fishing effort and catches (i.e., they continued to increase, see Table 3), but seemingly not on catch/effort ('CPUE'), which, incredibly enough, remained relatively stable throughout the entire period (Fig. 4). Although China's marine and fisheries research institutes became involved more than previously with issues of fisheries development (Anon 1980), analysis of commercial fisheries catch data never became part of their mission (a problem prevailing in many countries), and this manifest problem with the credibility of the statistical reporting system was therefore not addressed.

However, in 1987, a first serious attempt to control effort was initiated by the central government. Aimed only at limiting aggregate horsepower by fishing zone, it was referred to as 'single control' (see below for 'double control' measures). The control targets were never met and by mid-1990s, the status of the coastal resources was perceived to be bleak enough to require the central government to impose measures it considered draconian. Thus, beginning in 1995, an annual summer moratorium system was placed on boats operating in the Yellow Sea and East China Seas. In 1997, as part of the Ninth Five Year Plan (1996-2000), a 'double control' policy was announced, which aimed at limiting both the number of boats and their power (hence the name). In support of that policy, i.e., in an effort to better control inshore effort, the Ministry of Agriculture also had fishing permits reissued in all coastal provinces and cities. As well, the

Ministry called for further 'acceleration of fishery development through structural adjustment,' i.e., shift of fishing effort from inshore to offshore, expansion of the post-harvest sector, etc.). Moreover, the Ministry's emphasized the role of China's DWF as a (subsidized) priority industry,⁸ crucial for implementing the country's "sustainable development strategy." Consequently, on November 7, 1997, the Chinese Ministry of Finance and the State Taxation Administration announced that, in addition to the various tax incentives under the Eighth Nine-Year Plan (1991-1995), all domestically funded enterprises engaged in distant-water fishing would be exempted from income tax.⁹ Moreover, since 2000, the fisheries enterprises based on Hainan (see Fig. 1) are actively encouraged to fish in the Spratleys, and provided fuel subsidies and state guarantees against the risk of loss at sea and vessel confiscation in this contested area of the South China Sea (Valencia 1978), similar to the U.S. refunding costs incurred to those of its tuna vessels that stray into the EEZ of various countries along the coast of the Eastern Pacific. The first payments occurred in early 2001 (before the Chinese New Year).

Both the 'single control' and 'double control' measures failed and inshore fishing capacity continued to grow. In 1998 and each of the subsequent year, the summer moratorium, which one may describe as 'too little, too late,' was extended both in time and space, including a large area of the South China Sea (north of 12° N), while trawling in banned in Bohai Sea all year round. In 1998, China also opted for an unprecedented 'zero growth' policy for setting annual marine catch targets. This policy stipulates that all levels of government and fishery administrative departments in each coastal province, are to take appropriate measures, based on local conditions, to guarantee the achievement in 1999, of zero growth in marine catch, which changed the previous practice of aiming toward ever increasing catches. (Note that this previous practice was usually expressed in form of 'guiding targets' by top leaders, then turned into 'local targets' by lower-level administrators). The zero growth policy continued in the year 2000, with the expected result that the official catch for 1999 and 2000 are almost exactly equal to that for 1998 (see Table 3), a theme to which we shall return in the section on 'the struggle against over-reporting.'

In 1999, the Ministry of Agriculture issued new fishery structural adjustment guidelines, again emphasizing strict control of fishing effort, and aiming for catch reductions.¹⁰ The measures designed to reduce effort included:

Table 1. Growth of the Chinese fishing fleet, 1952-1999, based on official statistics^a (all units * 1000; note interrupted time scale; kW and GRT are aggregated figures). These values are likely to underestimate true effort in the 'mass fishery' (see text).

Year	Motorized boats		Non-motorized boats	
	N	kW	N	GRT
1952	0.3	24	121.4	657.0
1957	1.5	76	135.2	733.0
1962	5.1	316	123.1	610.0
1965	7.5	458	129.4	570.0
1970	13.9	719	128.2	571.0
1975	29.2	-	-	-
1978	39.3	-	126.0	393.0
1979	42.8	2,150	120.0	363.0
1980	49.8	2,419	123.3	350.0
1981	60.9	2,627	118.5	330.0
1982	79.8	2,871	115.0	274.0
1983	95.9	3,064	103.6	248.0
1984	112.1	3,271	102.0	219.0
1985	132.8	3,639	93.8	196.0
1986	164.4	4,185	74.8	160.0
1987	196.3	4,832	76.3	145.0
1988	217.5	5,566	71.0	121.0
1989	234.1	6,293	66.5	107.0
1990	244.2	6,797	76.4	103.0
1991	242.7	7,242	64.8	91.0
1992	244.2	7,831	72.8	90.0
1993	250.1	8,107	46.3	68.4
1994	259.3	8,394	43.5	60.7
1995	274.0	9,801	40.8	65.8
1996	280.4	10,755	-	-
1997	282.5	11,219	-	-
1998	283.2	11,801	-	-
1999	280.0	12,181	-	-

a) Based on data from China Sustainable Development Information Network-Ocean (<http://sdinfo.coi.gov.cn>) and State Oceanic Information Network (<http://www.coi.gov.cn>)

- (a) A stop on permissions to build new fishing vessels (except for distant water fishing purposes);
- (b) A 'comprehensive clear up of illegal boats';
- (c) A prohibition on the introduction of foreign boats to fish in the Chinese EEZ;
- (d) The gradual establishment of a mandated vessel retirement system; and
- (e) The strict prohibition for non-fishing laborers to take jobs in marine fisheries.

In the second half of 2000 [the "Year of Fishery Quality" - as opposed to mere 'quantity'], as part of their effort to control inshore fishing effort, the Chinese authorities carried out a first-ever national census of marine fishing vessels (see below for some choice results). Finally, on December 1, 2000, a revised Chinese Fishery Act went into effect, which, among other things, increases punishment for illegal fishing (incl. use of destructive methods such as explosives), and lays the legal foundation for a quota management system.

In parallel to these developments, nominal landing figures continued until 1998 the stratospheric climb initiated in the mid 1980s (see Fig. 2), reaching such improbably high values that questions as to their credibility began to be raised openly. This is the main topic of this report, but it will be addressed after we briefly discuss the structure of the fishing fleet, to illustrate yet another aspect of the loss of control alluded to above.

1.4. Structure and growth of the fishing fleets

1.4.1 The domestic fleets

Sarhage and Lundbeck (1992), referring to the late 1980s, provide a good starting point for describing the Chinese fishing fleet:

"It is difficult to estimate the number of fishing vessels. A very large number of small sampans and sailing junks, possibly more than 400,000 are used for this purpose. Motorization started during the 1920s, and today the number of motorized ships is estimated at 157,000. Most of these vessels are, however, small and only suitable for operations in inshore or inland waters. A high-sea fishery began only in 1985 and is now carried out with more than 50 larger stern trawlers."

According to the recently completed national marine fishing boat census, China's three fisheries administrative zones (Bohai & Yellow Seas, East China Sea, South China Sea) currently boast a total of 244,300 registered motor fishing boats, totaling 5.41 millions GRT, with a total power of over 12 million kW.¹¹ This may make China the country with the highest number of marine fishing boats in the world. However most of them are small, as noted in the above quote. Thus, for example, while Shandong Province has 40,000 marine fishing boats, 90% of these are powered by motors under 44 HP.¹²

Presently, three official documents are required for engaging in fishing activities along the Chinese coast:

1. A fishing vessel inspection document;
2. A fishing vessel registration document; and
3. A fishing permit.

According to results of the national boat census, as many as 28% of the boats lack all three required documents and 21% lack at least one of them. Of all the problematic boats, 72% are small boats less than 12 meters long, including 15,600 light boats or rafts, of which many, operating in inshore nurseries, are reported to utilize destructive fishing techniques, including explosives. Similarly, the East China Sea Zone census report,¹³ covering Jiangsu Province, Shanghai City, Zhejiang Province, and Fujian Province, notes that statistics for small-size boats in that zone are incomplete, and that the actual power of the motor boats' main engines is usually higher than in the boats' registration papers. The same source indicates that only 34% of the 117,000 marine fishing boats have all three licenses. Also, the overwhelming majority of the light boats, sampan and rafts operate without license.

Similarly, in the South China Sea Zone, about 50% of 78,000 fishing boats lacked at least some documents and 23% lacked all.¹⁴ Of the problematic vessels, 90% were small motorboats with engines of less than 59 HP, i.e., light boats, sampans or rafts, many of them working as gillnetters.

It must be realized, however, that this large number of vessels is not the result of a deliberate policy by the central government. In contemporary China, state-run enterprises contribute only 10% of nominal landings, and an even smaller fraction of boat numbers [Also, they tend to operate at "tremendous losses" (Mathew 1999)]. Rather, the uncontrolled growth of the so-

Table 2. Structure of the Chinese fishing fleet in 1995 (motorized boats only) by boat type, size and ownership. The data (from China Fisheries Network (<http://www.china-fishery.online.sh.cn>)) are arranged by province, from the northeast to the southwest (see Fig. 1).

Number of catching boats											
	Private sector					State-Owned					
HP	> 600	200-600	61-199	21-60	< 20	> 600	200-600	61-199	21-60	< 20	All boats
Mean kW	555	204	89	26	8	558	250	95	37	9	
Mean GRT	262	99	41	12	4	334	117	49	14	3	
Province											
Liaoning	166	39	1,547	8,859	19,837	102	9	99	131	74	30,863
Hebei	14	110	1,462	1,968	5,283	14	1	19	2	0	8,873
Tianjin	14	15	236	393	271	14	0	0	0	0	943
Shandong	128	708	2,541	8,103	33,892	103	67	160	104	708	46,514
Jiangsu	57	780	2,064	6,751	10,603	55	94	39	11	2	20,456
Shanghai	125	71	354	57	56	125	42	7	0	0	837
Zhejiang	281	6,471	12,760	4,918	15,615	141	25	19	3	0	40,233
Fujian	39	2,663	4,528	6,682	38,562	14	9	2	10	37	52,546
Guangdong	388	3,059	6,167	9,548	31,653	71	14	13	6	113	51,032
Guangxi	37	865	1,004	1,319	7,222	19	22	5	0	5	10,498
Hainan	17	299	1,794	2,908	7,502	6	6	14	0	5	12,551
TOTAL	1,100	15,080	32,910	51,506	170,496	664	289	377	267	944	273,633
Number of carrier boats											
	Private sector					State-Owned					
HP	> 600	200-600	61-199	21-60	< 20	> 600	200-600	61-199	21-60	< 20	All boats
Mean kW	578	205				601	244				
Mean GRT	292	99				361	117				
Province											
Liaoning	216	60	-	-	-	142	27	-	-	-	445
Hebei	15	118	-	-	-	15	9	-	-	-	157
Tianjin	18	19	-	-	-	16	1	-	-	-	54
Shandong	160	827	-	-	-	126	101	-	-	-	1,214
Jiangsu	62	832	-	-	-	60	104	-	-	-	1,058
Shanghai	139	76	-	-	-	139	47	-	-	-	401
Zhejiang	312	6,801	-	-	-	259	99	-	-	-	7,471
Fujian	43	2,728	-	-	-	17	12	-	-	-	2,800
Guangdong	409	3,077	-	-	-	81	22	-	-	-	3,589
Guangxi	37	869	-	-	-	19	22	-	-	-	947
Hainan	21	303	-	-	-	12	10	-	-	-	346
TOTAL	1,432	15,710	-	-	-	886	454	-	-	-	18,482

-called 'mass fisheries' is the result of an inability to enforce legislation and regulations on the ground, whether they deal with safety issues, diversion into the fisheries of local resources from other sectors, or the related issue of local authorities encouraging the growth of local fleets, a theme to which we shall return when discussing the accuracy of the landing statistics.

The explosive growth of the number of small crafts since 1985 is the result of two factors, both acting simultaneously. The first of these is the 1985 relaxation of price controls over fishery products, which made many forms of fishing profitable that earlier had not been, and thus tempted many to try their luck fishing. The other factor, occurring in the same period, is the enormous mass migration of farmers and farm workers to coastal areas (Mathew 1999). This exodus itself had two causes. One is simultaneously economic and cultural, and is tied to the fact that, in China, as in most other developing countries, the cities offer more economic prospects and culturally richer lives than the countryside. The other driving force behind this mass migration is ecological: between 1985 and the early 1990s, China lost over 5 million hectares of farmland, especially in Eastern China and in the hinterland of various coastal provinces,¹⁵ with the trend continuing unabated into the mid 1990s (Smil 2000), and beyond (Anon. 2000).

Since 1985, the number of fishery workers in China has increased by six million, of which about 2 million are engaged in fishing itself.¹⁶ Hence, the increase in the number of new, small boats operating inshore using gear considered destructive by authorities, or even by traditional fishers. Here, we have a clear-cut case of what Pauly (1997) described as 'Malthusian overfishing.'

Currently less than 50% of the boats that are operating along the Chinese coast have been inspected with regards to their safety features.¹⁷ As a result, a large fraction of the marine accidents along the Chinese coast involves boats built without permit.¹⁸ In the wake of an increased death toll in 1999, the Chinese Ministry of Agriculture, in January 2000, issued an urgent notice to authorities at all administrative levels to step up inspection of fishing boats, to stop allowing modification of steel vessels over 20 years old and of wooden vessels over 15 years (if the modifications are designed to enable them to engage in distant water fishing), to stop licensing imported vessels that are over 20 years old, and to tighten licensing and management of ship inspection personnel.

Clearly, the Fishery Act of 1986, which strongly promoted fishery development, is outdated in that it cannot deal with the new problems that have surfaced after a decade and a half of deepened economic reform. Notably, the Fishery Act does not enable China to meet its new responsibilities as a signatory to recent international treaties, conventions and agreements, notably the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, and FAO's Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries. Moreover, the Act is widely perceived as too lenient, and its articles too vague to guide enforcement acting against those who contravene its various articles.

What may be called 'local protectionism' has also played a role in creating the present uncontrolled situation with regard to the operation of fishing vessels, especially the small ones. In many areas, local officials have granted fishing or boat construction permits to applicants who, had the regulations been implemented, would have been found not to qualify, in order to collect fees to supplement their own incomes, and/or finance the institutions they work for. In other cases, local officials have intentionally overlooked the status of vessels lacking licenses, as their own political careers benefit from reports of high local 'production.' We shall document this as we later return to this theme, which also explains numerous anomalies in nominal landing statistics.

Another aspect of lost of control over the fisheries is that local fishery law enforcement authorities are chronically short of funds, and generally lack the means to carry out their responsibilities. Thus, for example, according to the director of the Fishery Superintendence Bureau of Jiangsu Province,¹⁹ there are only four law enforcement vessels at the provincial level, totaling 940 GRT, and 30 vessels at city or county level, all poorly equipped and under-motorized – this for a province with a nominal catch of over 500,000 t. Not only are the enforcement vessels slower than the fishing boats they are supposed to supervise, but also, they lack the operating funds required to sustain their normal operations.

1.4.2. The distant-water fleets

It was only in 1985 that China started fishing outside of the Chinese Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), with high hopes for diversified, lucrative activities. However, the distant water fisheries never succeeded in overcoming the so-called 'two-90% syndrome,'²⁰ which deals with the fact that 90% percent of the distant-water landings come from bottom trawling operations and that 90% of

the fish is taken from other nations' EEZs through payment of access fees. Or put differently: so far, China has not really managed to deploy a modern high sea fleet concentrating on large pelagic fishes and other resources in international waters. Rather, what China did, in effect, was to deploy part of its coastal fleet along foreign coastlines. Thus, 95% of the Chinese distant-water fleet consists of small vessels capable of operating only in waters with depths less than 200 m, i.e., on continental shelves. Moreover, 90% of the larger boats designed for high sea fishing are second-hand vessels over 18 years old, and thus prone to malfunction and requiring frequent repairs.²¹

The Chinese government and researchers have realized that the importation of second-hand boats cannot provide a lasting technological basis for the distant water fleet. However, financing is major obstacles to self-reliance in this area, as vessels suited for tuna fishing on the high seas are tremendously expensive. Moreover, Chinese shipyards do not presently master the construction of modern long liners and seiners with speed, deck machinery and freezing capacities suitable for internationally competitive tuna fishing operations.

Still, in 2000, Chinese tuna catches were of the order of 29,800 t, representing an increase of 54% over 1999.²² China has since 1994 participated in multinational negotiations on the management of Central and Western Pacific tuna, and became a member of the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tuna in 1996, and of the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission in 1998. With regard to these bodies, China follows the classical tactic of catching as much as possible, in order to secure as high quota as possible in future multinational negotiations, the plan being for China to double or triple in the next few years its present 1% share of the global tuna catch.²³

The other major type of oceanic resources targeted by the Chinese distant-water fleet are squids. The fishery began in 1990 in the Sea of Japan, and grew rapidly. Restricted by the EEZ of Japan and Russia, Chinese squid boats in the Northwest Pacific must operate mainly between 150° E and 158° E.²⁴ Many of the Chinese squid fishing boats are converted small demersal trawlers, which lack year-round sea-going capability. Until a fleet of larger squid boats capable of year-round operation is built, the Chinese deep-sea squid fleet will remain unable to alternate between the fishing grounds in the North and the South Pacific, as done by the Korean and Japanese squid fishing fleets.

Since 1996, Chinese companies have been paying access fees to New Zealand and Argentina to fish for squids in their EEZs. In 2000, China reportedly caught 330,500 t of squids, an increase of 48,400 t over 1999.²⁵ By late February 2001, China had sent 93 squid boats to the Southwest Atlantic, where the current daily catch per boat is in the range of 3-10 t, lower than during the corresponding period of 2000.²⁶

In January 1997, the Chinese State Council approved the Ministry of Agriculture's call for further expansion of China's DWF as an important component of the Ninth Five-Year Plan (1996-2000), committing itself to treating it as a priority industry and to provide it with special support.²⁷ Added to the various taxation incentives under the Eighth Five-Year Plan (1991-1995), on November 7, 1997, the Department of Finance and the State Taxation Bureau announced exemption of income tax for all domestically funded enterprises engaged in distant-water fishing.²⁸

Overall, by 1998, China had over 1,200 distant-water fishing vessels and 27,000 fishery workers in West Africa, North Pacific, Southwest Pacific, South Asia, and Southeast Asia, catching over 900,000 t of fish valued at US\$ 5 billion.²⁹ In 2000, the DWF increased to over 1,700 units operating on the high seas and in waters of over 30 countries and regions under bilateral agreements. However, their aggregated nominal catch was 865,200, less than in 1998 and 1999.³⁰

1.5. Nominal catches and their composition

1.5.1. Tonnage, by year and province

This contribution deals with the reliability of Chinese landing statistics. However, before presenting our arguments, we must present at least a subset of these data, to provide a background for the subsequent discussion.

Table 3 presents nominal landings by fishing zone for the period 1952 to 2000. Note the rapid growth from the mid 1980s to the mid/late 1990s, and essentially identical values for 1998, 1999 and 2000, a first result of the Chinese government's 'zero growth' policy discussed further below.

Table 4 presents nominal landings by province, some ecological characteristics of the fish caught and the gear types for the year 1995, representative of the period of concern here, during which nominal landings increased at phenomenal rates. One noteworthy aspect of this table is that it tacitly includes some catches

Table 3. Nominal Chinese marine landings (1000 t) by fishing zone, 1950 –2000^a

Year	Bohai Sea	Yellow Sea	East China Sea	South China Sea	Other Areas^b	TOTAL
1950	-	-	-	-	-	595
1952	-	-	-	-	-	1,060
1955	-	-	-	-	-	1,720
1965	-	-	-	-	-	2,120
1966	-	-	-	-	-	2,283
1974	-	-	-	-	-	3,006
1975	-	-	-	-	-	3,406
1978	-	-	-	-	-	3,145
1979	322	604	1,342	486	-	2,773
1980	294	515	1,415	552	37	2,813
1981	285	468	1,491	529	1	2,774
1982	286	573	1,594	623	23	3,099
1983	289	623	1,468	681	11	3,072
1984	317	611	1,645	725	7	3,305
1985	375	619	1,690	777	24	3,485
1986	390	653	1,801	960	92	3,896
1987	418	773	1,932	1,153	105	4,381
1988	465	850	1,919	1,276	123	4,633
1989	488	940	1,987	1,472	149	5,036
1990	516	1,086	2,073	1,615	219	5,509
1991	588	1,170	2,178	1,788	372	6,096
1992	810	1,208	2,311	2,068	515	6,912
1993	858	1,320	2,642	2,241	612	7,673
1994	905	1,487	3,275	2,601	691	8,959
1995	954	1,706	4,378	2,377	853	10,268
1996	1,077	1,984	4,338	2,880	2,211	12,490
1997	1,291	3,352	5,000	3,136	1,075	13,854
1998	-	-	-	-	-	14,967
1999	-	-	-	-	-	14,976
2000	-	-	-	-	-	14,775

^aNote interrupted time scale (see Fig. 2 for interpolations). Based on data from China Fisheries Science and Technology Information Network (<http://www.cafs.ac.cn>), China Fisheries Network (<http://www.china-fishery.online.sh.cn>), State Oceanic Information Network (<http://www.coi.gov.cn>), China Agriculture Information Network (<http://www.agri.gov.cn>), and China Fisheries Information Network (<http://www.ifishery.com>). Small differences between data in this table and their original sources are due to rounding errors;

^b'Other areas' is an ill-defined category which does not appear to include the DWF. Used here to balance zonal and total catches.

Table 4. Nominal landings by province and gear type in 1995 (1000 t). Based on data from China Fisheries Network (<http://www.china-fishery.online.sh.cn>)

Prov. \ Area	Bohai Sea	Yellow Sea	East China Sea	South China Sea	Other areas	ALL AREAS	Inshore %	Pelagic %	Trawl %	Seine %	Drift/gillnet %	Fixed gears %	Long. lining %	Others %
Liaoning	397	409	28	0	79	911	83	36	29	3	22	26	3	16
Hebei	155	1	1	0	4	160	97	37	3	0	46	34	2	15
Tianjin	18	0	0	0	6	24	76	28	20	0	26	14	5	35
Shandong	376	900	236	0	106	1,618	79	40	49	2	13	22	1	13
Jiansu	8	372	182	0	6	567	7	40	26	0	8	50	0	15
Shanghai	0	25	60	0	77	162	43	67	79	16	0	1	4	0
Zhejiang	0	0	2,347	0	123	2,470	34	66	64	4	5	21	2	3
Fujian	0	0	1,524	45	51	1,620	59	25	45	10	9	24	3	9
Guangdong	0	0	0	1,494	120	1,614	78	30	62	8	16	1	8	4
Guangxi	0	0	0	498	1	498	88	35	84	1	3	4	2	6
Hainan	0	0	0	341	0	341	82	47	10	11	54	8	11	7
DWF	0	0	0	0	283	283	0	0	100	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL	954	1,706	4,378	2,377	852	10,268	63	41	52	5	12	19	3	8

assigned to provinces, but taken from fishing grounds not adjacent to these provinces' coastal waters. This is due to most provinces having their own offshore and/or distant water fleet. Here, however, we use 'DWF' to refer only to the national distant water fleet, the China National Fishing Corporation. We do not return to this theme as these fleets do not contribute much to China's overall catches, notwithstanding the attention and subsidies they receive from various levels of governments.

Table 5 is more instructive, as it indicates that the bulk of the landings belong to the 'other' category ('other fishes,' 'other crustaceans,' etc.). Table 6 documents this problem on a province basis, while Fig. 2 emphasizes its temporal aspect. As might be seen, the large differences in level of taxonomic aggregation among provinces still leads, at the national level, to about 60% of the catch being allocated, every year, to the 'other' category (Fig. 2). In many countries, a large fraction of 'other' fishes and invertebrates is usually an indication of data tampering, since it is easier to fabricate unspecified than species-specific landing data. In the case of China, however, the explanation may be that (a) the State Statistical Bureau (SSB) requires its local offices to report only on a small number of species, the rest being of the 60% of landings assigned to the 'other' category, and (b) Chinese consumers, who generally prefer freshwater over marine fishes, have only a few favorites among marine species, most contributing to the 40% of the landings that are assigned to low-level taxa. [One of these favorite incidentally is (golden colored) large yellow croaker, which can fetch prices of up to 100 US \$ per kg (Mathew 1999).

1.5.2. Species and size composition

The waters along the Chinese coast, and offshore to the limits of the Chinese EEZ are rather species-rich, due to the country ranging from a center of tropical fish biodiversity in the South to temperate waters peopled by completely different assemblages in the North (Richardson 1846). Overall, FishBase reports 659 species of marine (fin-)fishes from Chinese waters (Froese and Pauly 2000). However, not all of these species are equally important, and some species, such as the belt- or cutlassfish *Trichiurus lepturus* and the large yellow croaker *Pseudosciaena crosea*, have long dominated the demersal catches, though they are now far less abundant. This uneven contribution by different species is accentuated by statistics which poorly differentiate between fish (and invertebrate) taxa, the bulk of the landings being lumped into the 'other' category (see Tables 5 and 6, and Watson, this volume).

As in other areas of the world, the strong fishing pressure to which the Chinese marine fisheries resources are subjected appears to have led to massive changes in catch composition, reflective – at least in part – of changes in the structure of the underlying ecosystems. That the contribution to the nominal landings of traditional species such as cutlass fish (*T. lepturus*) and large yellow croaker (*P. crosea*) should have declined is not surprising: after all, overall landings have increased, and some of this increase is certainly due to previously underexploited species (including jellyfish, see Table 5) now having become the target of new fisheries. However, as these new species overwhelmingly consist of small pelagics such as the anchovy *Engraulis japonicus*, and small invertebrates, it is obvious that we are here confronted with yet another instance of what Pauly et al. (1998) have called 'fishing down marine food webs,' wherein large slow-growing, long-lived species with high trophic levels (TL), i.e., predators such as *P. crosea*, are replaced in the ecosystems and in the catches by small, short-lived species with low TL, i.e., by forage fish and invertebrates (see, e.g., Tong et al. 2000 for the case of the Bohai Sea).

This effect is documented here by Fig. 3A, presenting TL trends in Chinese nominal landings (as reported to FAO for Statistical area 61, i.e., the Northwest Pacific), and estimated from data in FishBase 2000 (Froese and Pauly 2000), based on the approach in Pauly et al. (1998). The trend line consists of two segments: the first, from 1950 to 1969, is completely flat, reflecting an unchanging composition of the landings (not a realistic feature, thus implying problems with the underlying data), and a second period of variable, but generally declining mean TL, indicating a transition toward fishes and invertebrates generally low in their respective food webs. This is confirmed by Fig. 3B, which presents similar trend of mean maximum size, i.e., mean maximum length of the species in the landings, weighted by their catch. [Divide this by 3 to obtain approximate mean length in the catch]. Note that the precise definitions of these lengths is of little import here: what matters is that they are declining, in spite of the crudeness of the underlying catch data, thus indicating lack of sustainability (Pauly et al. 2001).

Moreover, this between-species effect is strengthened by a related within-species effect, due to size reduction of the mean size of carnivores, which also reduces their trophic level (Pauly et al. 2001). For instance, the average length of cutlassfish declined from 21.5 cm in 1959 to 17.1 cm in 1981 and 15.6 cm in 1999, with less than 1% of the landed individuals over 2

Table 5. Composition (in %) of nominal landings by species (groups), 1978-1996 (1000 t). Based on data from China Fisheries Science and Technology Information Network (<http://www.cafs.ac.cn>) and State Oceanic Information Network (<http://www.coi.gov.cn>).

Landed group ^{a)} \ Year	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996
<i>Pseudosciaena crosea</i>	2.61	2.57	2.64	2.48	1.64	0.94	1.04	0.62	0.36	0.31	0.30	0.29	0.35	0.31	0.39	0.47	0.78	0.66	0.72
<i>Larimichthys polyactis</i>	0.67	1.13	1.10	1.08	0.86	0.80	0.51	0.74	0.42	0.36	0.40	0.26	0.34	0.59	0.68	1.04	1.17	1.50	2.29
<i>Trichiurus lepturus</i>	10.76	13.71	12.68	15.44	13.72	12.49	11.41	10.94	8.54	7.19	6.04	6.31	7.02	7.04	6.69	8.44	9.94	10.22	9.66
<i>Scomber japonicus</i>	3.14	3.51	2.58	2.29	2.98	4.26	3.14	2.22	2.78	3.03	3.98	3.52	2.78	3.06	2.62	3.63	3.80	3.65	3.37
<i>Decapterus maruadsi</i>	4.70	2.85	4.94	4.27	4.93	5.89	5.07	5.58	5.01	6.29	4.14	4.85	5.47	5.29	4.22	3.47	4.88	5.06	5.48
Filefishes	8.62	3.29	4.94	6.47	7.40	3.81	8.21	6.50	8.98	7.42	4.34	5.94	4.75	3.60	1.70	1.28	2.22	1.20	1.89
<i>Engraulis japonicus</i>	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	40.00	54.00	113.00	193.00	557.00	439.00	489.00	671.00
Pomfrets	0.86	1.35	1.32	1.30	1.59	1.27	1.39	1.60	1.49	1.66	1.06	6.31	7.02	7.04	6.69	-	-	-	-
<i>Ilisha elongata</i>	0.33	0.47	0.46	0.46	0.36	0.39	0.43	0.41	0.42	0.26	0.25	1.08	1.17	1.20	0.79	-	-	-	-
<i>Scomberomorus niphonius</i>	0.45	1.32	1.57	1.49	1.70	1.71	1.90	2.17	1.98	1.81	2.06	0.24	0.32	0.39	0.32	-	-	-	-
<i>Clupea pallasii</i>	0.61	1.22	1.17	1.08	0.64	0.58	0.23	0.07	0.13	0.24	0.17	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Other fish	36.66	37.83	35.73	33.91	34.09	35.63	32.07	31.90	33.49	33.38	35.44	28.65	29.68	28.75	29.53	45.98	44.40	45.96	43.09
Total finfish	69.40	69.29	69.15	70.27	69.89	67.72	65.40	62.69	63.63	61.96	58.17	58.05	59.68	58.69	55.71	71.70	72.17	73.05	72.53
Penaeid shrimps	1.06	1.69	1.10	0.90	0.47	0.80	0.89	1.74	2.36	3.41	4.19	3.20	3.15	3.21	2.64	-	-	-	-
<i>Acetes</i> spp.	5.42	3.07	4.08	4.80	4.45	4.64	4.77	4.98	3.68	2.95	3.15	3.29	2.98	2.73	2.46	-	-	-	-
<i>Trachypena</i> spp.	0.33	0.35	0.46	0.09	0.36	0.66	0.66	2.03	2.92	1.97	2.29	1.12	1.38	1.15	1.09	-	-	-	-
Other crustaceans	7.23	7.72	7.24	7.15	7.79	7.46	8.72	8.08	6.90	7.53	8.25	8.41	7.59	7.93	7.53	-	-	-	-
Total crustaceans	14.08	12.80	12.92	12.93	13.05	13.57	15.06	16.82	15.88	15.89	17.05	16.02	15.11	15.03	13.71	17.11	18.31	17.02	17.27
Cuttlefish	1.72	2.82	2.46	0.90	1.39	1.46	1.37	1.26	1.05	1.09	1.21	0.86	0.97	0.87	0.74	-	-	-	-
Mussels	2.67	2.07	1.96	2.97	2.98	3.15	3.47	3.07	4.44	5.71	7.10	7.44	7.00	6.27	5.80	-	-	-	-
Scallops	-	0.00	0.00	0.06	0.03	0.06	0.10	0.19	0.50	0.80	2.01	1.96	2.07	2.38	3.64	-	-	-	-
Other molluscs	4.78	4.77	5.22	5.29	5.82	6.94	6.89	8.01	9.15	9.72	9.79	10.60	10.73	10.45	11.81	-	-	-	-
Total molluscs^{b)}	9.18	9.66	9.61	9.19	10.21	11.64	11.84	12.53	15.15	17.31	20.11	20.85	20.78	19.97	22.00	9.26	8.07	8.13	7.68
Jellyfish	0.11	0.41	0.28	0.56	0.50	0.30	0.94	1.45	0.40	1.08	0.53	0.53	0.55	1.21	2.46	1.77	1.28	1.69	2.39
Algae	7.23	7.84	8.04	7.05	6.35	6.77	6.77	6.50	4.94	3.78	4.14	4.55	3.88	5.10	6.11	0.16	0.17	0.11	0.14

a) Filefishes include *Thamnaconus* and *Tripodichthys blochii*; pomfrets include *Pampus argenteus*, *Ephippus orbis*, and *Parastromateus niger*.

b) Note that shelled mollusc weights were originally expressed as 'meat weight' (=1/2.5 total wet weight).

Table 6. Nominal landings by species (groups) and province in 1995 (1000 t). Based on data from China Fisheries Network (<http://www.china-fishery.online.sh.cn>).

Species \ Province	Liaoning	Hebei	Tianjin	Shangdong	Jiangsu	Shanghai	Zhejiang	Fujian	Guangdong	Guangxi	Hainan	DWF	TOTAL
<i>Pseudosciaena crosea</i>	5.8	0.0	1.1	7.4	0.4	0.0	8.1	15.1	25.2	0.0	3.9	0.0	67.0
<i>Larimichthys polyactis</i>	6.3	0.9	0.0	66.4	40.6	1.7	33.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	3.5	0.0	153.0
<i>Trichiurus lepturus</i>	6.9	0.1	3.0	50.1	143.0	4.5	579.9	121.9	90.7	8.9	30.7	0.0	1,039.7
<i>Ilisha elongata</i>	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.7	1.9	0.0	9.9	6.3	24.1	2.5	1.1	0.0	46.6
<i>S. niphonius</i>	5.8	0.5	0.0	88.1	50.1	0.2	25.0	21.9	41.9	20.9	17.2	0.0	271.6
Pomfrets	1.5	0.1	0.1	22.3	29.8	0.9	76.1	27.3	36.9	4.3	9.8	0.0	209.0
Snappers	1.6	0.0	0.0	0.6	0.1	0.0	1.7	3.8	36.7	6.7	7.4	0.0	58.6
<i>Scomber japonicus</i>	50.0	0.4	0.0	77.5	38.7	24.9	80.3	38.9	42.6	14.0	6.7	0.0	374.0
<i>Decapterus maruadsi</i>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	9.5	211.4	218.0	69.0	7.1	0.0	515.2
<i>Engraulis japonicus</i>	66.4	0.3	0.0	354.7	4.9	0.0	9.4	18.3	26.8	3.2	5.0	0.0	489.1
<i>Sardinops melanostictus</i>	1.3	0.1	0.0	5.2	0.3	0.2	0.3	0.0	43.9	5.0	2.1	0.0	58.4
<i>Clupea pallasii</i>	0.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.6	0.1	0.0	2.3
<i>Muraenesox cinereus</i>	0.2	0.0	0.0	3.0	1.0	0.2	48.9	54.8	28.6	3.4	14.7	0.0	154.9
Groupers	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	2.3	8.2	3.3	9.0	0.0	23.0
<i>Liza haematocheila</i>	3.1	10.7	0.3	14.1	0.0	0.0	1.2	0.0	22.9	17.9	1.3	0.0	71.4
<i>Nemipterus virgatus</i>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	104.2	72.9	47.5	0.0	224.6
Filefishes	0.5	0.0	0.0	6.6	3.6	6.8	16.9	19.2	42.0	18.9	7.8	0.0	122.4
Total finfish	477.7	73.0	13.2	1,111.6	332.6	133.6	1,651.6	1,323.5	1,363.4	388.0	295.7	272.0	7,436.0
<i>Penaeus spp.</i>	0.7	1.3	0.4	2.0	0.2	0.0	2.6	7.6	15.5	10.5	2.3	0.0	43.0
<i>Trachypenaeus ssp.</i>	12.2	1.0	0.1	54.4	9.3	0.0	16.5	31.5	19.8	5.7	1.3	0.0	151.7
<i>Acetes chinensis</i>	68.5	18.5	1.4	65.2	19.2	10.0	115.6	27.6	27.9	30.5	5.9	0.0	390.4
<i>Portunus ssp.</i>	6.7	2.9	0.2	15.5	36.7	8.1	78.3	45.4	38.8	9.5	1.2	0.0	243.5
<i>Scylla serrata</i>	5.5	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.0	0.0	1.4	4.5	10.7	1.2	1.5	0.0	25.2
Total crustaceans	214.3	0.1	6.6	284.5	102.8	18.2	656.0	1,175.0	147.3	59.5	0.0	0.0	2,664.3
<i>Sepia esculenta</i>	14.8	0.9	1.3	11.8	3.1	0.1	80.9	57.4	23.3	14.6	5.5	0.0	213.8
Other molluscs	146.8	23.0	2.9	3.6	86.0	6.8	73.4	45.0	43.2	30.2	14.0	-	476.1
Total molluscs	161.5	23.9	4.2	15.3	89.2	6.9	154.3	102.4	66.5	44.8	19.6	1.3	689.9
Jellyfish	47.3	5.5	0.1	59.9	35.6	0.4	5.1	4.4	7.7	3.8	2.1	0.0	171.9
Misc. marine products	9.5	3.8	0.0	8.4	6.8	2.7	2.0	14.2	25.7	2.1	6.6	7.9	89.7
Algae	1.1	0.0	0.0	0.4	0.0	0.0	1.1	0.4	3.6	0.0	4.1	0.0	10.6
TOTAL CATCH	911.5	160.1	24.1	1,618.1	567.1	161.8	2,470.2	1,620.0	1,614.2	498.2	340.6	282.6	10,268.4

years. This is similar for large yellow croaker, whose mean length in landings was 21.4 cm in 1959, about 20 cm in 1981, and 15.4 cm in 1999, also with less than 1% of the landed individuals over 2 years.³¹ This effect is not accounted for in Fig. 3A and 3B; if it were, this would accentuate the downward trends displayed therein.

One problem with using a declining trend of mean trophic levels of landings as evidence of the increasing ecosystem impact of a given fishery is that moving down the food web may be the result of a deliberate choice, for which justification may be found in an increased demand, as occurs in China. After all, biological production does tend to increase by a factor of about ten as one moves down one trophic level in typical marine ecosystems (Pauly and Christensen 1995). Thus, one could argue that a fair evaluation of the impacts of a fishery should not be based on an index which simply decline as the fishery moves down the food web of a particular ecosystem. Rather, such index should decline only when catches do not increase as expected. Thus, we also present here a time series of an index enabling us to assess whether the Chinese marine fisheries are balanced (FIB) in ecological terms (Pauly et al. 2000a). The FIB index is defined, for any year i in a series by

$$\text{FIB} = \log (\Sigma Y_i * 10^{\text{TL}_i} / \Sigma Y_o * 10^{\text{TL}_o}) \quad \dots 1)$$

where Y_{ij} is the catch of species (group) j , TL_j its trophic level in the catch, Y_{oj} the catch at the start of the series and TL_{oj} the mean trophic level in the catch at the start of the series. [Note that the FIB index, as defined here, assumes a 10% transfer efficiency between trophic levels, a mean value applying to a wide range of marine ecosystems (Pauly and Christensen 1995)].

Figure 3C shows that the FIB index for China has increased since 1950, which implies (a) a geographic expansion; or (b) excessive catch estimates (see Pauly et al. 1998, 2000a, 2001, for more details on the interrelationships between catches and trophic levels). As the data underlying this analysis originate, in principle at last, only from FAO area 61, only the limited catches (of squid and pollock, see section on DWF) from fishing grounds East and Northeast of the Chinese shelf could have contributed to item (a); hence we conclude that (b) applies, i.e., that the FIB index confirms the suspicion of over-reporting.

Most of the small fishes presently caught by the Chinese coastal fisheries, i.e., fishes that grow to small size, and the juveniles of large species, are

now used for fish meal, which feeds a rapidly expanding demand from the aquaculture sector (both freshwater and marine), a trend which may, in the long term, compromise net food fish supply to Chinese consumers (Naylor et al. 2000), but not followed upon here.

While some fisheries management techniques, such as seasonal closures, have been attested in China as early as 2000 B.C. (Mathew 1999), only a few stock assessments of individual species, using contemporary concepts in fish population dynamics, i.e., reaching beyond yield per recruit analyses, appear to have been conducted on Chinese marine fishes. One of these few studies, published in English, is that of Huang and Walters (1983). Its main result, pertaining to the East China Sea stock of large yellow croaker, *Pseudosciaena crosea* (Richardson, 1846), was that the fishing effort levels prevailing in the late 1970s had already led to a massive reduction of the biomass of this long-lived, coastal and hence highly vulnerable fish, and that its yield would decrease upon further effort increases. Chen (1999) confirms this:

“In the 1960s and 1970s, fishing season and fishing grounds were very distinct but became weaker because after the 1970s the stock size had been in continuous decline.”

However, as fishing effort increased, nominal catches of *P. crosea* from the East China Sea rebounded from a low in the mid 1980s, then engaged in a steady climb (see Table 3.1 in Chen 1999), suggesting the assessment to have been erroneous, or the statistics from the mid-1980s to be questionable. [The earliest stocking program for *P. crosea* was initiated in 1997, too late to explain the reported high catches (about 80,000 t) of this species in the mid 1990s (see Table 6). Had the catches of the late 1990s been the result of a stocking program, this would have made it one of the rare success stories in a field where failures abound].

1.6. Chinese fisheries statistics

Although there is a huge literature on the economic history of China, it must be realized that:

“Any discussion of the outcome of various attempts to quantify China’s economic experience must, out of caution, begin with a health warning concerning their ability to reflect accurately the contemporary economic reality. There was no systematic compilation of statistics, either government




Figure 3. Ecosystem status indicators for Chinese marine waters (FAO Area 61), adapted from Fishbase 2000 (Froese and Pauly 2000).

A Nominal catch (from FAO) and mean trophic level of catch;

B Mean maximum length of species in the catch;

C FIB index, whose increasing value suggests that catches since the mid-1980s are too high, given their trophic level (see text).

or private, for output or income prior to the 1950s” (Richardson 1999, p. 25).

The Chinese State Statistical Bureau (SSB; then known as National Bureau of Statistics), established in 1952, thus fulfilled a real need. And indeed, from the early 1950s to the late 1970s, official Chinese statistics played a key operational role in the economic and political spheres. However, it is important to realize that statistics were not only put to what may be seen as their ‘natural’ use, as an economic tool for monitoring the (planned) economy, but also as a propaganda device, i.e., for motivating and mobilizing the Chinese people in the building of a socialist society. Thus, only trusted cadres, usually communist party members, were involved in collecting and interpreting statistical information.

Thus, as noted by Banister (1987), the Chinese government, since the very inception of the SSB, failed to introduce the principle of independence between statistical reporting and political control of the economy. She predicted that the choice of communist cadres and local political leaders as the persons primarily responsible for collecting statistical information would eventually lead, as indeed happened, to massive data manipulation. Another economist, Robert F. Dernberger,³² made similar comments on the Chinese official statistical system:

“One of the most important hypotheses of information theory tells us that such a system will not produce a very accurate set of statistics, i.e., the statistics should be completely independent from the individual collecting them, who should be neutral as to what those statistics say, and the ultimate users should be unknown to those who collect the statistics. Just as with the principle of free markets, no individual should have any influence over the final outcome. The production units at the lowest level have departments or assigned workers to collect the statistics for that unit and these statistics are then packaged and reported to their superiors at a higher level. Obviously, those doing the collecting are not neutral to what the statistics report and they know full well who will be using them and for what purpose [...] The State Statistical Bureau begins to aggregate statistics that are collected and kept at the county level, a rather high level of aggregation even before the State Statistical Bureau begins to aggregate these statistics even further as they are passed up through each successive level of the bureaucratic hierarchy for

reporting, i.e., to the Prefecture, the Province, and then the State level. This process of aggregation for the purpose of reporting provincial level totals and national level totals, of course, might result in offsetting differences from the truth being reported by lower levels. Yet, the deviations from the truth would tend to all run in the same direction, i.e., the reasons for under-reporting or over-reporting affecting all local units alike, causing the totals reported by higher levels to aggregate these deviations from the truth.”

Indeed, during Chairman Mao’s Great Leap Forward, in the late 1950s, zealots criticized the Chinese statistical system for showing wide gaps between the plans and the realities. Chang (1991, Chapter 12) gives a riveting eyewitness account of how various statistics were adjusted to show great success, even as the economy slid into disaster (see also Lippit 2000). Subsequently, the State Statistical Bureau (SSB) was able to enjoy a short period of autonomy before its staff were accused of ‘revisionism,’ and their institution utterly destroyed during the Cultural Revolution.

During the decade spanned by the Cultural Revolution, Chinese intellectuals and professionals (including statisticians) were sent to ‘re-educate themselves’ in the countryside. As well, large amounts of statistical data were burned. It is only in the late 1970s and early 1980s that the SSB began slowly to recover and to rebuild its hierarchy of provincial, prefecture, and county level bureaus and offices.

This rebuilding process accelerated in the mid 1980s, after China passed, in 1984, a Statistics Act providing a legal basis for a system of national statistics. This gave the SSB and its provincial branches responsibility for collecting all kinds of information, making it possible to standardize information gathering, monitor quality, and introduce modern methods of sampling and data processing. This Act also explicitly forbids political interference with the statistical data, especially the common habit of local or regional cadres to revise production data upward, and unpleasant statistics downward.

The primary function of SSB staff is to provide timely statistical information to economic and political decision makers. To meet this goal, the SSB has tried, since its revival in the late 1970s, to enable its lower-level offices to check on the statistics being collected within the various production units. The Bureau has also attempted to impose uniform standards and forms for the reporting of statistics throughout China. But throughout the last two decades, statistical

misreporting has continued to be widespread. Indeed, misreporting is considered to have become increasingly serious in the past two decades (Kwong, 1997, and see below).

A major problem involves what Albert Keidel, senior economist with the World Bank, describes as the 'tension' between target figures and reported results: "By emphasizing economic goals, the government invites inaccuracies."³³ In effect, and until recently, local officials were rewarded for reporting inflated production data, because production data were a key criterion for evaluating the performance of the local government and party officials, and of their departments. Thus, local officials had a strong incentive to report significant gains in agricultural and fishery development because promotions were closely tied to local increases in gross production figures. Conversely, local officials have no incentives to truthfully report falling or even stagnating landings. This theme is elaborated upon in the Section on 'the struggle against over-reporting,' but may be introduced here by a few examples.

The 1996 Chinese poultry production figure was found seriously over-reported after it was compared with the result of China's first national agricultural survey, conducted in 1997. Over-reporting has been officially admitted and the 1996 poultry output figures have since been retroactively corrected³⁴.

A nationwide statistics law enforcement check carried out in 1997 uncovered 60,000 cases of violation, with 57% involving misreporting and/or tampering with data.³⁵ According to the Deputy Director of the SSB, aggregate data from provinces, cities and counties were more problematic than macroeconomic figures and over-reporting was most serious with the production figures from township and village enterprises (TVEs). Moreover, most of the false reporting had the explicit support of local government officials.³⁶

In Summer 2000, the Director of the SSB, Mr Zhu Zhixin pointed out what he perceived as three deficiencies in current Chinese statistical work:

- 1) Government leaders and high ranking civil servants are complaining that the SSB often fails to provide timely statistics, and that the statistics compiled and presented are not useful for development planning;
- 2) The public is aware of the discrepancies between optimistic statistics and the reality they experience daily, while the statistics

also fail the academic and business communities;

- 3) Foreign researchers and businesspeople have the impression that all Chinese statistics are unreliable.

These deficiencies undermine both the national and international academic research needed for sound policy development, as well as the government's policy of encouraging foreign investments.

Similarly, at the year 2000 annual meeting of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), which runs annually in Beijing in parallel with the annual session of Chinese National People's Congress, Li Lijun, a CPPCC member from Hunan Province, called for stern action against statistical frauds and for a reform of the official assessment system:

"Fraudulent statistics have become a serious problem in some areas and government departments at all levels. Every year 40,000-60,000 cases come to light involving fraudulent statistics. Such frauds not only affect the country's economy by jeopardizing economic planning and policy-making, but also tarnish the government's image and encourage corruption. To stop such fraud, we must enhance the legal awareness of officials at all levels and strengthen the responsibility system. Major officials should be held responsible for violating the Statistics Act. Furthermore, research and survey techniques should be improved to increase statistical accuracy. Due to outdated statistical methods and poor supervision, the statistics submitted by local governments include serious fabrications. Statistical research methods such as sampling, therefore, should be improved and survey processes be made transparent. Also, supervision by the press should be allowed and reform must be carried out to improve the official assessment and promotion system. Economic statistics should not be the sole standard for the assessment of official. Finally, there is a lack of laws to prosecute offenders for minor violations. Pertinent regulations should be promptly made to guarantee punishment of violating officials."³⁷

This topic also appeared at a press conference marking the occasion of the publication of the Statistical Communiqué of the People's Republic of China, February 26, 1999. There, a reporter asked raised the issue of the quality of statistics,

pointing to informal reports stating that the production of meat and aquatic (fisheries) products had been overestimated by 40% (see also FAO/FI, 1999; and endnote 36). In his response, the then Director of the SSB, Mr. Liu Hong, did not reject the 40% figure, but rather admitted that over-reporting, and the 'watery component' of statistics (the Chinese equivalent to 'airy' statistics, i.e., statistics that do not hold water) existed, due to some local officials' attempts to obtain positive performance evaluations. He went on to explain that inaccurate statistics on meat production were also caused by limited staff in rural statistical offices, where a certain amount of estimates were obtained through inferences that may be seen as problematic.³⁸ Unfortunately, Mr. Liu Hong did not comment specifically on the accuracy of fishery statistics.

His successor, Mr. Zhu Zhixin conceded in 2000 that China does not have a sound statistical system, and he called on the creation of an innovative system that would take fully into account the multiple interests of the State and local governments. He suggested that a number of parallel statistical systems might have to coexist for a while, which would then gradually be united into one uniform system.

One important aspect of a reformed system would be to introduce, for fisheries as well, the sampling surveys used for complementing and assessing the reliability of agricultural statistics, and which has led to the discovery of serious over-estimates in meat and poultry statistics (see above). Until this sampling survey approach is also applied to fisheries statistics, they will continue to be based on report forms filled out by officials from the fisheries sector itself.

On the other hand, a reform is being carried out to improve the assessment and promotion system of government officials, and particularly to ensure that reports of positive economic statistics should not be the sole standard for the evaluation of their performance. This brings us to the crux of the matter.

1.7. The struggle against over-reporting

The instances mentioned above of catch over-reporting and other kinds of statistical fraud need to be put in the broader societal context. That context is corruption. Some forms of this phenomenon are universal: they are one of the many results of the tension between private (or family) interest and the public good. In the West,

corruption often involves the political elite, e.g., via the funding of politicians' campaigns by individuals expecting various benefits for themselves or their companies (e.g., contracts, regulatory and tax adjustments, etc.). Examples are the case of a former German Chancellor, of most members of the Italian cabinet (until the 'Clean Hand' anti-corruption crusade of the mid-1990), of successive mayors of Paris in the 1980s and 1990s, or the continued revelations around the issue of 'campaign reform' in the USA. In China, over-reporting is considered to be a form of fraud, itself a form of corruption.

In Imperial China, the system of delegating state function such as tax collection and law enforcement to semi-private provincial and/or local entities bred a profound abhorrence of corruption, or '*tanwu*', well expressed by the two characters used to write that word, literally 'greed' and 'dirt.' This abhorrence also applies to the corrupt individual, government or society, for which '*fuhua*' or '*fuba*' are used, the former meaning 'rotten', or 'decomposed', the latter 'rot', and 'non-performance' (Kwong 1997, p. 3).

Indeed, corruption, and the perception of corruption have been major political factors throughout the two millennia of Chinese imperial history: dynasties, usually launched by energetic reformers, lasted only as long as they could control the effects on the populace of the inevitable corruption of its officials. Consequently, there were great hopes that the Republic founded in 1911 would rid the country of the corruption that contributed to the downfall of the late Qing dynasty; as is well known, this did not happen. However, the founding of the People's Republic of China does appear to have led to a reduction of the staggering level of official corruption that characterized the period from 1911-1949 (Kwong 1997), although there are some who are willing to contest this (see, e.g., Groombridge 1998).

In 1952, a strict Statute on Corruption was issued which provided detailed definitions of activities which the Communist Party and State apparatus would not tolerate. And just as 'insider trading' is an actively suppressed crime in some Western countries, but tolerated in others, the Statute included some offences that would not necessarily be considered corruption in the West. Kwong (1997, p. 14-15) describes this as follows:

"Pianqu, or *zapan* (fraud), is the intentional perversion of truth for the purpose of inducing another to part with his/her personal belongings. *Taoqu*, a term that appeared in the 1952 statute, has similar meaning, but is no longer popular.

Chinese officials had great powers and would simply demand what they wanted from their subordinates or charges, who were ignorant of their rights, *but these same official would have to file misleading or false reports misrepresenting themselves or their organizational achievements to obtain materials or recompenses they were not entitled to from their superiors.*" (Our emphasis.)

The 1952 Statute was strengthened, in 1957, by a Regulation on Reward and Punishment of State Administrative Personnel, which warned state employees against corruption in general (*tonwu*), but also specifically against false reporting and lying to their superiors (Regulation 4). As Kwong (1997, p. 17) emphasized:

"the actions covered by Regulation 4 were similar to fraud even though individuals might not get something substantive for their personal use – in the socialist system, many officials submitted false reports so as to remain in the good book of their supervisors."

Interestingly, these regulations did not discuss smuggling, or financial speculation, presumably because these activities, rampant at the end of the Qing dynasty and in the ensuing Republic, had ceased to be important in the mid 1950s.

In the section of her book devoted to 'Pervasive Gray Corruption,' Kwong (1997) provides a definition of the term 'gray' (or administrative) corruption, distinct from legal/criminal corruption. Thus she writes:

"Officials engaged in false reporting, bribery, misuse of public funds, defrauding the government and other misdemeanors for their own interest and that of their organizations. Many more of these examples fall into the administrative definition of corruption than the legal one, and can be categorized as gray rather than black corruption [...]. What sets China, and indeed other socialist countries, apart from the capitalist West is not any basic difference in the nature of corrupt activities but the salience and peculiar form some of these activities have taken due to unique socialist structural arrangements. A brief comparison of corruption in China and the capitalist West will highlight this point. First, Chinese socialist state officials fabricated reports to please their superiors. In the West's more democratic society, administrators feel much less compunction about catering to the demand and interest

of their superiors. Because of the different ownership structure, many such reports would be of no interest to Western governments. If submitted, the authors would be reprimanded for fabrication, and not accused of corruption."

It may have been expected that with the gradual dismantling of the planned economy in China, and the establishment of a market economy, gray corruption as defined here have declined, just as smuggling and speculation declined following the founding of the People's Republic of China. In fact, the opposite happened: all forms of corruption, including gray corruption increased following the 1978 onset of reforms, and the excesses that outraged the populace in the 1980s (Gong 1994) have been matched by the even more outlandish excesses of the 1990s (Huang 2001). Indeed, the increase of corruption is worrying the Communist Party and the Government, which have cracked down – notably with death penalties – on well-connected gangs, notably in the richer coastal provinces.

A related problem is local patriotism, or 'mountaintopism' (*shantouzhuoyi*), 'departmentalism' (*benweizhuoyi*), or various forms of parochialism (*difangzhuoyi*), i.e.,

"the pursuit by managers of the unit's interest to the detriment of the collective interest. People who engaged in organizational corruption based on false reporting, bribery, extortion [...] could console themselves that they were doing it for their organizations and not for themselves" (Kwong 1997, p. 71).

As Shapiro (2001), a naturalized Chinese and member of the Chinese People's Consultative conference points out:

"The duel goes on: 'You have your *zhen ce* (measures), we have our *dui ce* (counter-measures),' is a popular saying. The local governments do everything they can to ignore or get around national orders which they consider to be to their disadvantage. In some cases, local governments will even falsify reports to Beijing, to assure compliance when in fact there is none. This has become an extremely serious problem in achieving national legal standards, with no immediate solution in sight."

In fact, competition, e.g., for water resources, or reduction of the tax burden from the capital has always been strong among Chinese provinces (Hendrischke 1999), and similarly for counties within provinces (Jacobs 1999). Such competition can reach all the way to the smallest production

units, which is not surprising, given that between-firm competition ('socialist competition,' encouraged by Lenin in the Soviet Union in the early 1920s) always was a strong component of Chinese socialism. Also, many small, reportedly 'collective' township and village enterprise (TVEs) are in fact privately owned (Chai 1998, p. 182; see also Fewsmith 2000, Mood 2000 and Wilson 2000), and can be expected to compete in a more or less open market.

In the meantime, the statistics thus generated continue to serve a multitude of partly contradictory purposes, many still related to their use in local competition and for propaganda. Anon. (1999) puts it as follows:

"With gradual perfection of the Chinese market economy system, fishery statistical data not only serve the state plan (sic!) program, macro control and adjustment, but also serve the society and the mass fishery production and management units. [...] The special statistical institutions and statisticians work for the aggregate statistical survey at ministerial, provincial, municipal, county and township level in terms of professional affairs and are responsible for the superior departments and the local governments."

This multiplicity of tasks, a serious case of 'mission drift,' combined with the coupling of personal career advancement with reports of increased production from local enterprises, has provided a strong incentive for local government officials to continue over-reporting of landings from the local fisheries 'production and management units' under their purview. Two features of official Chinese fisheries statistics support this:

1. Incompatibilities between different types of information;
2. The regularity of the annual landings increases since the mid 1980s, suggestive of steady exponential growth.

An example of item (1) is the continued increase, since the mid 1980s, of the reported landings of large long-lived species (such as large yellow croaker *Pseudosciaena crocea*) that were already severely overfished in the 1970s, when overall effort was much smaller, and perhaps more importantly the lack of decline since the early 1980s, of nominal catch/effort ('CPUE') in the Yellow/Bohai Seas, East China and South China Sea fisheries, despite two- to five-fold increases in fishing effort (Fig. 4). Such stability of catch/effort implies either of the following:

- a. That the resource base is barely impacted by fishing;
- b. That the stocks are 'hyperstable' (Hilborn and Walters 1992), i.e., that they are experiencing a range collapse as they are fished down, largely unnoticed because the fisheries operates at the core of the stocks' ranges;
- c. That the fisheries are constantly expanding, and depletes one stock after the other (sequential overfishing), the expansion being both geographic and ecological, i.e., the fisheries move down the food web;
- d. That the apparent increases of nominal catch did not really occur, and that catch/effort did in fact decrease.

It can safely be assumed that (a) and (b) do not apply to the situation prevailing here, because Fig. 4 indicates a strong decline of catch/effort from the 1960s to the 1980s. Rather, while we concede that (c) is occurring as well (see above), we consider Fig. 4 to provide strong evidence of landing records having been doctored such as to suggest that increase of effort (new boats) led to more or less proportional increases of landings. Such linear coupling of effort with landings is often, if wrongly assumed by bureaucrats the world over, and it is therefore not surprising in the case of China.

[Two staff members of the South China Sea Bureau of Fishery and Fishing Port Superintendence, Ministry of Agriculture, have recently analyzed historical fishery data from the South China Sea. Their results briefly recalled below confirm the above re-interpretation of the catch/effort data in Chen (1999):

Due to use of the large number of wooden sailing boats in the earlier period of Chinese fishery development, they first converted the number of these boats into horsepower (7 wooden boats = 1 motorized boat of 29.4 kW or 40 HP). They found that catch/effort first rose, from 1.31 t/kW in 1953 to 2.3 t/kW in 1959, dropped to 0.69 t/kW in 1981, then gradually increased, reaching 1.06 t/kW in the late 1990s. Given that the power of the fishing boats in the area (Guangdong, Guangxi, and Hainan provinces) has increased dramatically over the years from only 4 motored boats with a total power of 595 kW to 74,175 motored boats with a total power of over 3 million kW, an increase of catch/effort goes against all that is known about the impact of fisheries on the resources they exploit. The researchers then examined the catch/effort of a number of trawlers from Dongguan City, Guangdong, which had been monitored, and noted that their catch/effort had




Figure 4. Trends of nominal catches, effort and catch/effort ('CPUE'), 1960-1995 (from Chen 1999). Note unrealistic constancy of catch/effort from 1980 to 1995 [Also note break of x-scale between 1970s and 1980]

dropped from 792 kg/kW in 1986, 616 kg/kW in 1991, and 369 kg/kW in 1998, far different from what the nominal catch statistics imply. Therefore, they came to the conclusion that the published statistics for nominal catches in the South China Sea are higher than actual catches, the over-reporting rate being in the order of 30-40 %.^{39]}

Another example of incompatibility (item 1 above) is provided by FAO/FI (1999), wherein staff of FAO's Fishery Information, Data and Statistics Unit noted the discrepancy between Chinese marine fisheries landing and household fish consumption data, which imply an increase of per caput fish supply that has not been observed on the ground, even if exports and the increasing fish meal production are taken into account.

Above item (2), i.e., the suspicious regularity of the increases in nominal landings is shared with several of China's neighbors, where for several decades, year-to-year landing increases are manufactured in the capital, by multiplying the previous annual figure with some, often constant percentage. [This can be checked by plotting, for various Southeast Asian countries, $\log(\text{landings})$ versus year, which generates straight lines, nicely parallel for various landings taxa and ecological groupings].

However, we believe that in the Chinese case, the landings increases were not generated centrally. Rather, we think that they were the results of relatively small adjustments, at successive administrative levels, by a vast number of independent, but similarly motivated local bureaucrats, just as described in the longer quote above by R.F. Dernberger. A large number of such independent, local 'adjustments,' which would tend to add small, normally distributed fractions [though truncated at the lower end] to an initial value, are all that is needed, via the Central Limit Theorem, to generate large, but similar (annual percent) increases when the data are aggregated at higher administrative levels. This is consistent with:

- The demonstrated over-reporting of production in the livestock and poultry industries, where the motivation for officials to over-report local output is similar to that in fisheries (see above);
- The spatial analysis of Chinese fisheries landings in Watson (this volume);
- Continued dependence of local enterprises on the whims of local officials (Shapiro 2001; Huang 2001); and

- Lack of effective mechanisms and/or interests countering over-reporting *at the local level*.

That the Chinese government is aware of these problems, and has tacitly acknowledged massive over-reporting of fisheries landings is evident from its establishment of a 'zero growth policy,' which explicitly states that landings must cease increasing above the 1998 level.

The 'zero growth' policy of the Chinese government is at first sight disconcerting: what can be obtained by insisting that catches cannot/will not increase, if not a straight, flat series of catches over time (see Fig. 2 for the period 1998-2000), different from, but in its own way as fanciful as the exponential increases of the 1980s and 1990s?

The point is that the government's insistence that catches may not increase (except for the DWFs) removes all reasons for local officials to over-report catches from their villages, townships or counties, thus uncoupling their performance evaluation from production figures. This, on the other hand (and this is an explicit goal of the zero-growth policy), should encourage or force them to report on qualitative changes in the fishery, e.g., on success in phasing out illegal and excess inshore vessels, shifting deck crew into post-harvest jobs, further developing the DWFs and recreational fishing, etc. As well, the policy is intended to pave the way for 'progressive' provincial leaders willing to break with the old 'tonnage' ideology. The drastic zero-growth policy, strange as it may look to Western fisheries scientists, appears to be not only appropriate given the conditions prevailing in the Chinese fisheries sector, but also a necessary first step towards sustainability in inshore waters.

This may be illustrated through the example of Daishan, a coastal county in Zhejiang Province, where competitions for the biggest catches were held among fishing villages, for 14 years, from 1985-1999.⁴⁰ While the villages competed to win the title of 'Ten Thousand Tonnes Village,' the townships in which they were located competed to be that with the highest number of such villages in their jurisdiction. As it can be easily imagined, these competitions resulted in dramatic increases in the number of fishing boats in the area and rapid depletion of adjacent fisheries resources. The competition was abolished only in 1999, in response to the government's call for zero growth.

In a sense, the zero growth policy, which breaks with the past (statistics), is therefore similar to the break which, in the 1980s, saw China admit,

first to itself, then to the world, that its national aquaculture statistics, then based on unwarranted extrapolations from a few model farms, were wildly exaggerated.

There is a good, additional reason for such break: the deplorable state of the Chinese coastal environment and its ecosystems are rapidly nearing the point at which they will become unable to support productive activities - our next and last topic.

1.8. China's coastal environment

Liu and Chen (2000) writing on "the present status of Chinese fishery" assert that:

"thanks to the intensified effort of protecting offshore fisheries resources, extension of the rest period of fishing and expansion of extent of fishing prohibition, the stock numbers offshore has seen an obvious rise again, and the output of marine fishing reach 14.97 million tons, 8.0% from that in the previous year."

We cite this not only because this provides a good example of scientists using alleged landing increases to expound at international meeting on the wisdom of governmental management decisions (here: a recently introduced 2-3 month seasonal closure for coastal gear), but to illustrate how optimistic assessment of this sort can coexist, in Chinese accounts, with the perception, albeit dim, of a much gloomier reality. Thus, Li and Chen (2000) conclude the above cited abstract with the concession that:

"Although great efforts have been made by the coastal provinces (municipalities and autonomous regions), to control the sewage discharged into the sea, the pollution of the near shore water is still serious and the overall quality of the marine environment tends to be deteriorated and the open-sea waters is also being threatened. The task for the sustained development of marine resources has a long way to go."

And indeed it does: China is probably one of the countries of the world with the most serious pollution problems (Mirsky 2001, Shapiro 2001; Smil 2001) both with regards to the terrestrial and the marine environments.

Chen (1999) gives a brief review of coastal pollution along Chinese coastlines, with emphasis on the Northeast, where studies have been more intensive, and where the damage appears to be worse. He lists numerous sources and examples of pollution (point sources or through rivers, i.e.,

involving discharges from the hinterland), notably raw sewage from cities and other human settlements and pig farms, industrial products (oils and other organic chemical, including pesticides, heavy metals, etc.) and effluents from mariculture industry (disease organisms, harmful algal blooms).

Here are a few new examples, most adapted from Anon (2000):

- The frequency, duration and offshore extent of red tides have been increasing since 1990,⁴¹ and they have reportedly caused 120 million US\$ worth of losses to the fishing industry in the Bohai, Yellow and South China Seas in the Spring of 1999, and may be one of the reason for the drastic decline of landings of commercial algae (see Table 5);
- Fishers in Hebei province filed suit in November 2000, claiming that wastewater from upstream paper mills in Henan Province had killed 3 million US \$ worth of the fish they usually target;
- A 1999 study conducted by a team from the Georgia Institute of Technology estimated that reduced sunlight due to sooty air may be depressing agricultural yields by 5-30 % over 70 % of China [leaving open the question whether this would impact coastal primary production as well];
- Erosion causes the loss of about 5 billion t of topsoil per year, washing away nutrients equivalent to 54 million t of chemical fertilizer, twice the annual Chinese production of this product [this leaving open the question whether the topsoil reduces coastal fertility (by increasing turbidity, as does airborne soot, see above) or increases it (because of the nitrogen and other nutrients it contains)].

Making sense of such disparate information is difficult. One generality may be that in most cases, probably including China, marine ecosystems are impacted more strongly by fishing than by pollution, while the converse applies inland.

However, while this may be true in relative terms, the absolute damage to coastal marine resources may be considerable. As no integrative meta-analysis is available from the marine environment, we present in Table 7 a number of estimates of the percent of the annual Chinese Gross Domestic Product (GDP) that is lost through pollution, if only to indicate the orders of magnitudes that are involved here.

The estimates in Table 7 were based on a variety of methods, ranging from contingent valuation (i.e., ‘willingness to pay’) for the World Bank study, to detailed analysis of the economic impacts of premature deaths due to increases of respiratory illnesses for some other studies. Consequently, there has been a lively debate about appropriate methodologies, with emphasis on methods that work in data-sparse situations, or rather in a situation “abounding in dubious statistics and unverifiable claims and peopled by masses of uncooperative bureaucrats prone to treat any unflattering statistics as a deep state secret.” (Smil 1998).

One interesting aspect of Table 7 is the consistently high values of the estimates of damage to China’s environment, which range from 5.4 to 13.9% of GDP, although pertaining only to terrestrial (incl. freshwater) resources. [Note that this argument holds even if the Chinese GDP, given the statistical problems alluded to above, were much larger, or much

smaller than assumed by the authors of the studies in Table 7; also it holds irrespective of one’s stand on GDP as an ‘ecologically adequate’ measures of the size of the economy in either developed or developing countries].

One implication is that the massive destruction of China’s natural resources (forests, freshwater, agricultural land, clean air, etc.) is such that, jointly with the (relatively small) population growth rate, it largely offsets the growth of the overall economy.

Another implication is that it becomes even more difficult to believe that China, of all major fishing nations in the world, should be able to keep increasing its coastal fisheries landings in the face of massive coastal pollution (including detritus from ubiquitous mariculture operations), and the consequent destruction of coastal nurseries. In other countries, including some of China’s immediate neighbors, lower levels of pollution (and lower of excess fishing effort) have led to stagnating or even decreasing catches.

Table 7. Estimates of damage to the Chinese economy (expressed as % of Gross Domestic Product) resulting from air, water and other forms of pollution, and from damage to China’s environment (excl. marine waters).

Year	Air	Water	Other	Environm.	GDP Sum of %	Source
1983	2.2	4.5	0.0	8.9	15.6	Guo & Zhang (1990)
1985	n/a	n/a	n/a	12.5	12.5	Jin Jianming (1994)
1990	0.9	0.7	0.5	5.4	7.5	Smil (1996)
1992	2.5	2.0	0.0	n/a	4.5	Sun (1997)
1992	2.4	1.5	0.2	13.9	18.0	Smi & Mao (1998)
1993	1.4	1.6	0.2	6.9	10.0	Zheng & Xu 1997)
1993	1.1	0.9	0.8	6.9	9.7	Xu Songling (1998)
1995	7.1	0.6	n/a	n/a	7.7	World Bank (1997)

1.9. Discussion

Accurate monitoring of and reports on economic performance indicators appear to have been a problem besetting the People’s Republic of China since its very beginning, in 1949. The two key reasons for these are both related to China’s governance structure. They are:

- a. Lack of political autonomy for the statistical reporting system and the recurrent, overt politization of that system; and

- b. A positive correlation between performance evaluation of local bureaucrats and their reporting of production figures matching predicted increases in national or provincial plans.

China dealt with item (a) by professionalizing its statistics collection system, i.e., it moved away from its earlier reliance on politically trusted cadres. However, as successive crises in the

European, particularly British, agriculture production systems illustrate (e.g., bovine spongiform encephalopathy, salmonella in poultry, persistent pollutants in farmed salmon), it is extremely difficult for governments to set up independent ‘watchdog’ agencies, capable of questioning the production-oriented policies of their various ministries (Rubery 2001).

The situation is even more difficult regarding item (b). During the first three decades of the People’s Republic of China, strong ethical standards were imposed from the top down, through dedicated communist party members and cadres, which together with the absence of opportunities for misdeeds, appear to have limited various forms of corruption, including that form of ‘gray corruption’ leading to over-reporting (i.e., over-reporting, during the early decades of the People Republic of China may have been more commonly the result of political zealotry than of naked personal gains). The economic reforms introduced in 1978, which explicitly encouraged people to “get rich,” and which questioned the ethical basis of earlier policies, had the unforeseen side-effects of an explosion of corruption cases in the 1980s and 1990s, and increased poverty among segments of the farmer populations in the hinterland. Massive coastal migration and the related growth of uncontrolled ‘mass fisheries’ offered rich pickings and increased opportunities for over-reporting to corrupt local official. China’s assessment and promotion system for officials (=civil servants) overemphasizes production output figures and in effect, provides incentives for statistical misreporting. This is facilitated by imperfect setup of the statistical system itself, and the fact that, as stipulated in a circular of 1985 jointly issued by the Ministry of Finance and the SSB on ‘Transferring Statistical Operating Expenditures to Higher [Administrative] Levels,’ the operational budget of the local offices of the SSB are appropriated at the local level.

This, combined with competition between production units, townships and even provinces, led to a massive inflation of landing reports. One irrefutable line of internal evidence is the nearly constant catch per effort reported since the early 1980 for all three major regions (Bohai & Yellow Seas, East China Sea, and South China Sea), even though nominal effort during this period has increased by factors of 2 to 6, and catch per effort had earlier (in the 1960s) been reported as declining. The central government’s ‘zero growth’ policy is in itself evidence, as well, that the nominal catch reports had lost their anchor in reality.

Another, more indirect line of evidence, is provided by the extremely high levels of environmental pollution and degradation prevailing in China, which has been estimated to reduce the Chinese Gross Domestic Product by 5-15%. Other countries, less impacted by pollution and environmental degradation, have experienced stagnating or even decreasing landings from their coastal waters, mainly due to impacts on inshore fish nurseries.

China’s central government appears to be quite aware of the serious over-reporting problem discussed here, and its response, the ‘zero growth’ policy explained above, may succeed in solving it. However, this does not resolve the issue of what the actual catches from the Chinese coastal fisheries actually are.

For this, we propose that ‘external’ landings estimates should be generated, using a comparative approach consisting of the following elements:

1. Using detailed and more reliable landing statistics from neighboring countries to interpolate the approximate composition of the large fraction of the Chinese catch allocated to ‘other fishes;’
2. Using the composition in (1), fish depth and latitudinal distribution data in FishBase (Froese and Pauly 2000), global primary production data from the European Union’s Joint Research Center, in Ispra, Italy, and other sources to allocate taxa to those areas of the Chinese EEZ over which they were likely caught;
3. Compare the catch distribution in (ii) with the global map of catch distribution recently derived in the context of work by the *Sea Around Us* project (see Pauly and Pitcher, 2000, and Pauly et al. 2000b); and
4. Estimate, through a General Linear Model, from (3), the likely landings in the Chinese EEZ.

Watson (this volume) presents an implementation of (1)-(4). These results fully confirm the main point of the present report, i.e., that official Chinese landings from the mid 1980s to the late 1990s were seriously over-reported. We hope that this will contribute to a re-evaluation of China’s official marine landing statistics.